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The Federal Social Security Act
By George P. Auld
The federal social security act as approved August 14, 1935,
embodies the most ambitious scheme of social insurance ever
adopted by a democracy. It focuses with great distinctness the
cleavage of opinion, recently grown so sharp, between the theory
of laissez faire, or “rugged individualism,” and that of collective
responsibility; and the fact of its passage by overwhelming con
gressional majorities offers impressive evidence that the latter
attitude is strongly entrenched in the public mind.
The act legislates on three major aspects of the problems of socalled economic security and creates a Social Security Board
charged with duties of administration. With respect to two of
the projects, it seems a fair assumption that the new law con
templates little of substance or method in the way of alleviation or
prevention of social maladjustment and human suffering that has
not come to be broadly acceptable today to every thinking Ameri
can. The legislation in those fields embraces (1) provisions calcu
lated to stimulate nation-wide legislation by the states creating
unemployment reserves of moderate size, as a charge on industry,
for the benefit of workers in occupations other than agricultural,
domestic and certain others, and (2) authorizations for federal wel
fare grants to the states which will supplement and tend to encour
age state appropriations for financial assistance to the needy aged,
for the blind, for dependent children and for general health services.
In a third field, the act provides for a national system of old-age
retirement insurance, whereby national reserves as a basis for the
payment of annuities after age 65 will be created from equal
contributions by employees in occupations other than agricul
tural, domestic and certain others, and by their employers. This
scheme has aroused controversy which seems likely to increase in
intensity as the implications of the plan become clearer and its
full impact begins to be felt.
From the viewpoint either of employer or employee, there must
be few who disbelieve in the desirability of industrial workers of
advanced years being enabled to give way to younger persons
without undue hardship. How best to promote this end is the
question. There are those who, knowing that security is a mirage,
are opposed in principle to establishing a comprehensive system
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of governmental aid, which in their view will only foster an illu
sion, tend to destroy individual initiative and increase dependency
and, perhaps, eventually create worse ills than those now requir
ing treatment. They believe the family to be the proper unit for
determining and providing necessary aid to the superannuated
worker, and that any national system of aid other than to the
destitute and friendless will be so vast and will lead to such abuses
as to fall of its own weight. They believe, moreover, that indus
try, out of whose product the population is supported, ought not to
be burdened by the taxation necessary to finance such a scheme.
These convictions are strongly held, and their strength is not di
minished by a very human dislike for all taxes as such and an equally
human tendency to believe that conditions not seen at close range
or personally experienced can not be as bad as represented.
Of another school, though still outside the ranks of the millions
of beneficiaries of the new legislation, there exists a substantial
middle-of-the-road opinion convinced or disposed to believe that
the conditions resulting from man’s failure to control the business
cycle are such as to demonstrate the gross inadequacy of any
system of old-age protection not nationally organized. Persons
of that persuasion believe that collective action in some form is
necessary and practicable and that in these days of world-wide
strain on the institutions of capitalistic democracy such action is
dictated by the highest considerations of political expediency.
Those who hold such views do not quarrel with the aims of the
present act. Nor are they rightly to be charged with paying mere
lip service to those aims when they express the view, as many do,
that the financial mechanism of the present scheme is so badly
devised as to make the plan a serious menace to our fiscal system.
The financial structure of the retirement plan is based on a
principle involving the accumulation, incredible though it may
seem, of forty-seven billion dollars of reserves intended to be
carried over to the next generation. This principle, in the view
of most financial authorities, renders the scheme as a whole unduly
burdensome, unwieldy and dangerous. Due to the complexity
and obscurity of the subject, there are few who appreciate that
this conclusion coincides with the judgment of the president’s
committee on economic security, a distinguished body of highminded and competent persons who were brought together in
1934 for the purpose of studying the subject and drafting suitable
legislation. The plan that they formulated, after extensive
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consideration, including investigation of the British and other
existing systems, never reached the floor of congress. Abruptly
substituted for it in the ways and means committee, on the
recommendation of the secretary of the treasury, and ultimately
enacted into law, was a scheme that the president’s committee
had rejected. The difference between the two plans was not
primarily or in important degree one affecting the scale of bene
fits to be paid. It was a difference in fiscal theory. The scheme
adopted represented an attempt to make the plan theoretically
“self-supporting,” by application of an actuarial principle which
in the opinion of the president’s committee and its actuarial and
financial experts was inappropriate and dangerous. The commit
tee and its experts were convinced that reserves should be kept
“within manageable limits” and that each generation should
pay its own costs.
The task of putting the plan on a proper basis in this respect
may conceivably prove more difficult as a matter of amendment
than it would have been in the first instance. Popular forces
supporting the principles of social insurance will be suspicious
of change, and political racketeers will play upon their suspicions.
Proponents of rugged individualism may make the mistake of re
garding a movement for amendment of the plan as offering an
opportunity for its emasculation. Nothing could be further from
a realistic attitude, for, unless all signs fail, the people intend that
a system of social insurance in one form or another shall operate
in this country. Persons competent in finance and men of affairs
generally will have the choice of adopting a constructive or a
destructive attitude. If they choose the latter, the difficulties
of reconciling conflicting views of political expediency and eco
nomic practicality may well place our institutions under a critical
strain. The British democracy, in connection with this problem
of social legislation, has successfully met such a test, for the Eng
lishman, in addition to being able to think straight on public
finance, is politically a highly astute person, instinctively aware
or persuaded by long experience that judicious compromise is the
foundation of all social order.

I. Federal-State System of Unemployment Reserves and
Compensation

A federal-state system of unemployment reserves and compen
sation is established by the social security act, whereby reserves
432
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accumulated under state tax and compensation laws will be
deposited in the federal treasury to be available for payments to
wage-earners who lose their jobs. Eligibility and other details of
administration of benefits will be governed by the respective state
laws, subject only to approval of the state scheme by the Social
Security Board as conforming to certain minimum standards,
including a prohibition of payments to beneficiaries sooner than two
years after the first contributions are made. Under the theory and
practice of unemployment-compensation laws, the benefits do not
apply to unemployed persons unless they have previously while in
employment been covered under the plan for a stated time.
In order to induce nation-wide enactment of state unemploy
ment compensation laws, the act under a separate title provides
for a federal tax, against which credits may be taken for state
taxes paid under state unemployment compensation plans, in a
manner similar to the scheme in effect since 1926 under the fed
eral estate-tax provisions of the revenue act. The new federal
tax is provided by the assessment on each employer of eight
or more workers, in all occupations not exempted, of a pay
roll tax of 1% in 1936, 2% in 1937 and 3% annually there
after. If a state now has or later sets up an approved unemploy
ment-compensation plan, an amount equivalent to the state tax
paid by the employer is deductible from his federal tax, up to 90%
of the latter; the remainder of the federal tax will be paid by the
employer into the federal treasury.
The coverage contemplated by the federal tax provisions em
braces workers performing service in the United States for em
ployers of eight or more employees, in occupations other than
agricultural labor, domestic service, service in the merchant
marine, service in the employ of son, daughter or spouse or by a
child under twenty-one in employ of parent, service in public
employment (federal, state or local) and service in non-profit
institutions operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scien
tific, literary or educational purposes or for prevention of cruelty
to children or animals. The federal tax is assessable only on
employers who on each of some twenty days of the calendar year,
each day being in a different calendar week, had a total of eight or
more employees. Such an employer is liable for the tax on total
annual pay-rolls of employees of the included classes.
The scope of the coverage in the various state plans will be as
wide as the legislatures of the respective states may determine.

433

The Journal of Accountancy

The tendency in the states, however, will be to restrict coverage
to the classes enumerated in the federal act as the basis for
the federal pay-roll tax, since any state burden imposed on the
employer in excess of 90% of the federal tax will operate to in
crease his total burden.
Under this scheme, the minimum total taxes payable after
1937 by an employer to his state government and the federal
government together will be 3%, except that in so-called “merit
rating” cases where under a state law the employer has qualified
for a reduction in tax by reason of having fulfilled certain stand
ards of regular employment, an equivalent amount may be de
ducted from his federal tax as an “additional credit,” under the
same conditions as if he had actually paid the normal state tax.
The maximum of all taxes for unemployment insurance payable
by any employer will be 3% in cases where the maximum rate
under his state law is 2.7%. Wherever the state tax exceeds
2.7%, the maximum total burden on the employer will be in
creased over 3% by the amount of the excess.
The probable aggregate tax levies (state and federal) in con
nection with unemployment insurance, on the basis of 1929 data,
and assuming uniform state tax rates of 3% on industrial pay
rolls, have been estimated by the National Industrial Conference
Board at between $940,000,000 and $965,000,000 a year.
The unemployment reserves which will be built up by these
contributions, separate for each state, are to be invested by the
treasury only in interest-bearing direct or guaranteed obligations
of the United States, acquired on original issue at par or in the
market, and the government may issue to the fund special nonnegotiable obligations bearing interest at the average rate being
paid by the United States government upon all its interest-bear
ing obligations. When required by the states to be used for com
pensation payments, the reserves are to be liquidated to the extent
necessary to meet the requisitions, within the limits of the funds
standing to the credit of the respective states.
As to the unemployment benefits that can be paid, the actuarial
consultants of the president’s committee on economic security,
upon whose investigations the legislation was based, estimated
that a nation-wide system of state plans levying pay-roll taxes
at a uniform rate of 3% would yield enough to pay unemployed
workers, on the basis of incomplete unemployment statistics
during the period 1922-1933, an average benefit, after a four434

The Federal Social Security Act
weeks waiting period, of half-pay, with a weekly maximum of
$15, for about 12 weeks.
*
After that the unemployed would
earn the right to compensation again only after finding reem
ployment and continuing in employment for a qualifying period.
State costs of administration of unemployment compensation
are to be met by the federal government, subject to approval of
the state system of administration by the Social Security Board.
Compulsory unemployment insurance plans have been in effect
in England and in ten other countries for some years, the British
plan dating in its original form from 1911. These plans cover
about 48,000,000 workers, a figure which also includes workers
covered in eleven countries having voluntary systems. All
European systems provide for nation-wide or state-wide “pooled
reserves” and the contributions to the reserves are in all cases
paid either (1) by the employers, (2) by employers and employees
or (3) by employers, employees and the government. The con
tributions are everywhere expressed as percentages of pay-roll,
except in England, Canada and Irish Free State where they are
fixed at uniform amounts per employee.
In the United States a number of voluntary systems established
by employers have existed for some years, but up to 1934 only
one compulsory unemployment-insurance plan had been created
—that of Wisconsin, which took effect July 1, 1934. Under the
Wisconsin plan, reserves separate for each plant or industry were
established. By the end of 1935 ten states had passed laws, of
which Wisconsin and Utah had employer-reserve funds; pooled
state funds are provided by New York, Alabama, California,
District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oregon
and Washington. Contributions by employees as well as em
ployers are required by five of the states, Alabama, California,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Washington; only in the
District of Columbia are state (i.e. district) contributions pro
vided (employees not contributing).†
The unemployment-compensation provisions of the act seek to
induce, by the tax-offset device, nation-wide adoption of state
unemployment-insurance laws. Before the passage of the act,
the adoption of such laws was blocked as a practical matter by the
competitive disadvantage in production costs which would have
* Revised estimates, per O. C. Richter (of American Telephone & Telegraph Co.) and W. R.
Williamson (of Travelers Insurance Company) (two of the committee’s consultants) in Trans
actions Actuarial Society of America, October, 1935, p. 331.
† W. J. Cohen, in Social Security, National Municipal League, New York, 1936.
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been laid on employers in states enacting the necessary legislation
without benefit of nation-wide application of the system. The
situation is now radically changed. The federal tax runs every
where, and the total burden on employers in states with compen
sation laws tends to be equalized by the federal tax credit device,
and in states levying a tax no greater than 2.7% will be equalized,
at the level of the burden on employers in states without compen
sation laws, where the federal tax must be paid in full. The
adoption of state legislation thus becomes expedient in order
that the contributions in any event to be made by employers may
be used within the state for unemployment compensation instead
of being paid into the general funds of the federal treasury.
The unemployment-compensation scheme has been described
as an attempt to provide first-line defense against the direct
social ravages of depressions. It is curious that criticisms of the
new plan seem to be less prevalent among those inclined to the
laissez-faire school of social thought than among the supporters
of compulsory insurance, who might have been expected to give
the scheme whole-hearted approbation. The truth is, however,
that academic authorities and social workers, generally favorable
to compulsory insurance, differ sharply among themselves as to
the relative merits of various types of plans.
These divergencies of expert opinion, partly theoretical and
partly based on studies of differing foreign practices, relate to
matters such as type of reserves, source of contributions, employ
ment eligibility qualifications and extent of waiting periods
before compensation begins to run. Differences on these points
were in large part responsible for the abandonment of any idea
of setting up under the act either a uniform national plan or rigid
detailed specifications for state plans under the federal-state
cooperative scheme actually adopted. In face of disagreements
over details, the president’s committee believed that the time had
come for “demonstration, not further debate and research.” Its
recommendation, to which Congress gave effect, was that latitude
be allowed the states for the working out of plans of various types,
in order that their respective merits might be studied at close
hand in actual operation. This recommendation, moreover, as
well as the separation of the taxing provisions from the regulatory
provisions of the act, was actuated by a desire to bring the legis
lation within constitutional limitations as such might be inter
preted by the United States Supreme Court.
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The federal control effected under the act is derived from and
restricted to the power of the Social Security Board to deny the
tax credit to employers in states whose plans fail to meet the fol
lowing general specifications, intended as “minimum standards
of security and fairness”: *
All compensation is to be paid through public employment
offices in the state or such other agencies as the board may ap
prove, and no compensation is to be payable until after two years
after contributions first required.
State unemployment funds are to be deposited with the un
employment trust fund of the United States treasury, and the
money when withdrawn is to be used solely for unemployment
compensation, exclusive of administrative expenses.
Compensation is not to be denied any eligible person for refusal
to accept work if (a) the position is vacant due directly to a strike,
lockout or labor dispute, (b) the wages, hours, or conditions of
work are substantially less favorable to the worker than those
prevailing in the locality, or (c) if the worker would be required
to join a company union or to resign from or refrain from joining
a bona-fide labor organization.
The state must retain the right to repeal or amend its law.
Estimates already quoted indicate that the contributions to
the reserves may ultimately amount to about $1,000,000,000 a
year. It is estimated that the maximum reserves to be accumu
lated may be $3,000,000,000 or $4,000,000,000.† How significant
the measure of relief effected by payments from such reserves will
be is of course problematical. In depression times they will meet
only a fraction of the problem. Whatever their significance
relatively to the magnitude of future unemployment, however, it
seems evident that a valuable partial solution of the problem will
result from systematic action under definite specifications gov
erning methods of contribution, standards of eligibility and
amounts of compensation. It will be a great gain to have one
substantial segment of emergency relief expenditures operated
under a controlled system, freed from the difficulties and abuses
inherent in the administration of relief expenditures made from
general appropriations as now provided;
The unemployment reserves to be built up in the treasury and
the balances which will normally stand in the reserve accounts
will be of far less magnitude than those contemplated by the oldage retirement plan. By the criterion of size alone the task of
* Report to the President of the Committee on Economic Security, January 15, 1935, Government
Printing Office, p. 16.
† O. C. Richter and W. R. Williamson, op. cit., p. 339.
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their investment and management should therefore be a simpler
one, but, as the president’s committee recognized, the fluctua
tions which will occur in the size of the unemployment reserves
will present special problems. In good times, the contributions
to the reserves are expected to exceed the disbursements, but
when serious depression sets in, the reserves will be depleted.
With the onset of the depression, therefore, the securities in
which the reserves are invested will have to be turned into cash,
with attendant intensification of the deflationary movement.
Such a stimulus to the deflationary movement would be likely
to occur, the committee pointed out, if the reserves were held by
the states or in private hands. Under the national plan, however,
it was the committee’s view that this may be avoided, since the
reserves would be so handled as to be coordinated with the credit
policy of the government. The ways and means committee
suggested that the treasury would not have to dispose of the
securities in the market but could “assume them itself.” * But
if securities are thus to be kept off the market it can of course be
done only by provision of cash by the treasury. If cash were
raised by taxation a deflationary movement would still be set
up, though presumably of less violence than one fostered by large
sales of securities. If, on the other hand, the treasury were to
raise the cash by borrowing, it is hard to see why the transaction
would not in essence amount to selling the government securities
taken over from the reserve fund. The treasury might of course
sell the securities to the federal reserve system but as the latter
has in any event the power to buy government obligations on the
market, no very important advantage would appear to be gained
by direct purchase from the treasury.
All in all, it seems illusory to expect that the operation of turn
ing investments into cash for necessary emergency expenditures
can be transmuted by the treasury into a beneficent reflationary
process. It is the expenditure of the cash by the beneficiaries for
consumption that should tend to neutralize the deflationary ef
fects of selling securities. If, as a further reflationary measure,
the federal reserve system should purchase securities in the market
of like or unlike amount, such action would constitute a monetary
or general credit operation not essentially related to the manage
ment of the unemployment reserves.
In boom times, on the other hand, it is argued that the treasury
* 74th Congress, 1st session, House Report 615, p. 9.
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could put a brake on credit expansion by issuing non-negotiable
securities to the fund and immobilizing the proceeds by keeping it
on deposit in the federal reserve system. This appears possible.
In that event it may be noted that the treasury would have to
subsidize the fund from general revenues in an amount equivalent
to the annual interest return required to be earned by the fund.
Whether it is wise that the treasury should possess the power of
intervening in monetary management by use of the unemploy
ment reserves is perhaps a somewhat academic question, since in
any event the ultimate control of the credit system of the country
rests with the government. However, it would appear wise that
the powers of the treasury in connection with the manipulation
of the reserve funds be at least more clearly defined than is the
case at present.
II. Federal Welfare Grants to States
and Other Purposes

for

Aged Needy

The problem of the aged needy, or of poor-relief, so-called
since Elizabethan days, has always pressed on the local communi
ties. Its administration has been inadequate and in many
communities inhuman and indecent. The old local poorhouse
basis of relief is no longer, however, in good odor, and at the end
of 1935 state pension plans, the adoption of some of which had
been stimulated by the passage of the social security act, were
in effect in thirty-nine states.
*
Population trends are making
the problem progressively more burdensome. Due to a declining
birth rate and the restriction of immigration, the proportion of
elderly people in our population is steadily increasing. There
are now approximately 7,500,000 people in the country who are
over 65 years of age. It has been estimated that by 1970 the
number will be 15,000,000, by 1980 17,000,000 and by the end of
the century about 19,000,000. Instead of 5.4 per cent. of the
population who were in this age group in 1930, it is estimated
that there will be 10.1 per cent. in 1970, 11.3 in 1980 and 12.7
per cent. in the year 2000.
In connection mainly with this problem the social security
act sets up a system of federal welfare grants embracing authori
zations for the annual appropriation of grants to the states from
the general revenues of the national government. Under these
* Eveline M. Burns, Toward Social Security, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1936,
p. 46.
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authorizations, the United States undertakes to match, on an
equal basis, the state’s appropriations for financial assistance to
“aged needy individuals” (thus excluding persons covered by
the retirement-insurance plan except as their annuities may be
too small to live on) up to a maximum federal contribution to any
person of $15 a month, plus 5% for administration costs. State
plans, to be approved, must be mandatory in all political sub
divisions.
The annual cost to the federal government of these old-age
relief grants by 1980 was estimated by the actuaries of the presi
dent’s committee at about $700,000,000, assuming the existence
of a contributory system substantially equivalent to the retire
ment insurance plan enacted in the social security act.
*
The
actuaries assumed a gradual increase in dependency ratio to one
in 1980 of 50% of all persons over 65, or over 8,000,000 de
pendents, before deductions for those to be cared for by the
retirement plan. The estimates were further made on the basis
of an average relief payment of $25 monthly of which half (plus
costs of administration), would be borne by the federal gov
ernment, and on the basis of approximately 4,600,000 aged needy,
after deducting those able to live on the annuities provided by
the retirement plan. The president’s committee considered the
actuaries’ figures to be based on excessive estimates of the de
pendency ratio and average benefits. They placed the cost on a
comparable basis at $300,000,000 annually. Recent reports of
Canadian old-age dependency ratios appear to support the esti
mate of 50% made by the actuaries.
O. C. Richter and W. R. Williamson, who participated in this
work say:
“. . . it is evident that the state and federal governments are
faced with large expenditures in future years for the relief of the
needy aged. The increase . . . can not properly be attributed,
however, solely to the passage of the act. It is mainly due to the
inevitable increase in the number and proportion of the aged in
our population. The relief problem in respect of this group would
need to be met in some fashion, regardless of whether or not the
social security act or similar legislation were adopted.”†
* O. C. Richter and W. R. Williamson, op. cit., p. 307. An apparent obscurity in the text of
their paper as to the scope of the retirement plan which was excluded in making the cost estimate
of $700,000,000 for old-age relief grants is cleared up by the above phrase “substantially equiva
lent to the retirement insurance plan enacted,” etc., added by the writer on oral information
supplied by one of the joint authors. Assuming no contributory system, the actuaries estimated
the federal half of the annual costs by 1980 at $1,300,000,000 for old-age relief to over 8,000,000
persons.
† Op. cit., p. 307.
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The act also provides for grants to the states for the blind, on
a fifty-fifty basis, with the same maximum on individual benefits,
as well as grants, up to certain maximums, for crippled or other
wise dependent children and for child welfare, maternal care and
health services in general. The annual cost to the federal
government of such grants is estimated at $75,000,000.
*

III. National Old-Age Retirement Insurance
A single system of contributory old-age retirement insurance
(“federal old-age benefits”) is created by the act for the benefit
of persons in occupations not exempted, the annuities thereunder
to be paid monthly to any person retired from employment who
is at least 65 years old and who will have earned not less than
$2,000 total wages after December 31, 1936 and before attaining
the age of 65, and who will have received wages on some day
in each of any five calendar years after December 31, 1936 and
before attaining age 65. Insurable service must be performed
within the United States.
Under the plan, annuities will be payable, beginning in 1942,
from reserves to be accumulated from 1937 from a federal pay
roll tax annually assessed on all employers of persons of eligible
classes and an equivalent special federal income tax annually
assessed on the wages of the employees, the latter tax to be collected
by the employers. Each of these two taxes starts at 1% in 1937,
and rises ½% at three year intervals to a maximum of 3% in
1949 and thereafter; neither tax is applicable to that portion
of an individual’s wage or salary which exceeds $3,000 annually
or to wages or salaries of persons over 65.
It has been estimated on the basis of the 1930 census that
about 26,000,000 persons, or 53% of the gainfully employed
population, will be covered by the old-age retirement provision.
The retirement scheme excludes workers not only of occupations
excluded under the unemployment compensation scheme (i. e.,
agricultural, domestic, marine, governmental and non-profit
institutions) but also casual labor not in the course of the em
ployer’s trade or business and also service in employ of a carrier
as defined in the railroad retirement act of 1935. The coverage
does not exclude one class excluded under the unemployment
compensation provisions, viz., service in the employ of son, daugh
* Based on estimate used by Eric A. Camman of $150,000,000 for total federal and state costs.
The Journal of Accountancy, April, 1936.
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ter or spouse or by a child under twenty-one in employ of parent.
Self-employed persons are excluded.
*
The annuities payable to beneficiaries are to range from a mini
mum of $10 a month to a maximum of $85 a month, determined,
within these limits, as percentages of total earnings (including
only that portion in any one case not exceeding $3,000 annually)
from January 1, 1937, to date of attaining age 65. The per
centages prescribed are ½ of 1% monthly on total earnings from
$2,000 to $3,000, 1/12 of 1% on the next $42,000, and 1/24 of
1% on the next $84,000. Stated another way, the monthly benefit
will be $5 on each $1,000 of the first $3,000 of insured earnings;
$5 for each $6,000 of the next $42,000 and $5 for each $12,000
of the next $84,000.
It will be noted that by the operation of this formula, the
maximum benefit of $85 a month or $1,020 a year will be received
by a retired worker who will have earned $3,000 (or more) a
year for 43 years after 1936, or a total of $129,000 insurable
earnings by 1980. His contributions during that period will have
amounted to $3,420 (or $450 less than the amount computed
at the maximum rate of 3% taking effect in 1949) and those of
his employer to an equal sum. In case of death of a contributor
either before or after retirement, his estate will be entitled to
receive 5½%† of the base total earnings, less the amounts of any
annuities received by him. A similar payment of 3½% of
earnings will be made to any living contributor who upon at
taining the age of 65 is not entitled to receive annuities.‡
The total tax revenue by 1949 under the old-age retirement
plan, computed at the maximum combined rate of six per cent.
which becomes effective in 1949, has been estimated by the
National Industrial Conference Board at from $1,700,000,000
to $1,850,000,000 annually, half payable by employers and half
by employees. The annual costs of the plan and the revenues for
its support rise gradually during the preliminary period between
* Under the so-called Clark amendment offered in the Senate but laid over for subsequent
attempt at agreement by the 1936 session of Congress, employers operating private pension
plans and their employees would have been exempted from the national system. The argu
ments that prevailed against its adoption were largely based on the probability that it would
result in adverse age selection against the public plan due to a preference of employers of rela
tively young workers to elect to operate under a private plan. This and other considerations
are discussed in Social Security in the United States, by Paul H. Douglas, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, New York, 1936.
† I. e., ½% in excess of his contributions if computed at the maximum rate of 3% and some
thing more than ½% for all entrants from 1937 to 1949.
‡ Among those covered by this provision will be all those who attain the age of 65 (a) not
having earned a total of $2,000 insurable earnings after 1936 or (b) not having been insurably
employed on one day of each of five calendar years after 1936 (which would automatically
include all persons whose 65th birthday falls on January 1, 1941, or before).
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1937 and 1980.
*
During that period income will keep substan
tially ahead of costs, the purpose being to build up the reserve.
Only a relatively small part of the reserve would be required as a
provision against current fluctuations in revenues, the bulk of
it being created for the sole purpose of providing an interest
earning fund. The Senate committee on finance † estimated
that shortly after 1965 the tax revenues then coming in at the
rate of $2,000,000,000 a year will be exceeded by the benefit
payments, so that the interest accumulations on the reserve will
then for the first time be called on. In 1980 the tax revenue will
reach its normal maximum at $2,180,000,000.‡ At that time the
maximum individual earnings of $129,000 spread over 43 years
will have accrued as a base for benefits, and the maximum normal
payments from that year onward were estimated at $3,500,000,000
annually. By that year the reserve, with interest accumulations
at 3% added and after deducting benefits paid in the meantime,
will amount to $47,000,000,000.
On similar estimates, the secretary of the treasury maintained
that the plan from 1980 onward will be “self-sustaining,” § the
aggregate annual benefits being provided 60% by annual con
tributions of approximately $2,100,000,000 and 40% by interest
earnings of approximately $1,400,000,000 on the reserve funds.
These estimates were based on an assumption that the average
worker will not in fact retire from gainful employment and thus
become eligible to benefits before the age of 67½ years. The
uncertainty of this assumption || together with the uncertainty of
other factors tends to cast doubt in the minds of actuaries on the
validity of the estimates. If workers were in fact to retire by 65,
the annual requirements of the plan would be increased by an
estimated amount of $1,160,000,000,¶which would have to be
provided from general revenues of the government. Another
apparently serious defect in the asserted self-supporting character
of the plan arises from the item of interest earnings on the reserve,
which will be discussed later.
Since benefits are computed on a scale of percentages of total
* Only minor costs will be incurred in the first five years, arising out repayments of contribu
tions to estates of contributors dying before 1942 or repayments to living contributors who do
not qualify.
† 74th congress, 1st session, Senate Report No. 628.
‡ However, M. A. Linton, president, Provident Life Insurance Company, one of the ad
visors to the president’s committee, states that the plan could ultimately be carried by a tax of
less than 6%.—Transactions Actuarial Society of America, October, 1935.
§ Committee on ways and means hearings—H. R. 4120, 74th Congress, 1st session, p. 905.
|| M. A. Linton, op. cit., p. 369.
¶ Eveline M. Burns, American Economic Review, March, 1936, p. 15.
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wages earned, which decreases as the amount of total wages rises,
it is apparent that the annuities, relatively to earnings and con
tributions paid, favor workers in the lower income brackets and
also favor persons entering the plan at advanced ages, who will
consequently become entitled to annuities after relatively short
periods of making earnings and paying contributions.
The relatively higher annuities to lower paid workers on equal
service are illustrated below by comparison of case 1 with case 2,
case 3 with case 4, etc., and the more favorable treatment for
shorter service at equal monthly earnings is illustrated by com
parison of case 1 with cases 3 and 5, and case 2 with cases 4 and 6
(full employment from 1937 to age 65 being assumed in all cases) :
Retirement
Average
Cases
Years
monthly
annuity,
*Total
entering
contri
monthly
before
wage for
in 1937
age 65
period
amount
butions
5,040
1
40
200
71,25
2,520
40
100
2
51,25
2,160
3
20
200
51.25
1,080
4
20
100
32.50
5
768
10
200
32.50
384
6
10
100
22.50
* ½ by employer, ½ by employee, at actual rates from 1937.

Annual amount of
annuity as percentage
of contributions
17%
24.4%
28.5%
36.1%
50.8%
70.3%

The figures in the final column above indicate the differential
favoring the lower earners and the shorter-period participants.
Equivalent differentials appear if contributions are compounded
annually at 3% for the respective periods to show the reserves
accumulated at the end of the periods, from which the annuities
will be paid. Taking the contributions uniformly at the maxi
mum rate of 6% on wages, the following reserve and annuity data
appear:
Annual
amount of
annuity as
percentage
of reserve
7.9%
11.3%
15.9%
20.2%
23.6%
32.7%

No. of years
reserve (a)
will pay
annuity
16
10
7
5
4
3

Years of life
expectancy at 65
unprovided for by
total
*half of
reserve reserve
5
†
2
7
5
9
7
9+
8
10
9
10+

Average
Reserve
Period monthly
at
in years wage
age 65
Case
10,858
40
200
1
40
100
2
5,429
3
20
200
3,869
4
20
100
1,935
10
200
5
1,651
100
6
825
10
(a) With interim interest accumulations.
* Indicating excess expectancy at 65 over anticipated exhaustion of half of reserve created
by employee’s own contributions.
† Overprovided four years.

Since the expectancy of life at 65 is approximately 12 years, the
final column above indicates that the annuities of persons like
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cases 2 to 6 will in part be paid from reserves accumulated for
persons like case 1.
Millions of persons of advanced ages will enter the plan in 1937,
and such persons, though in much smaller numbers, will contin
ually be entering in future years when they first take up employ
ment in an insured industry. The relatively more favorable
treatment which these contributors will receive constitutes the
so-called “unearned annuities” of the plan. These unearned
annuities will be carried by the disproportionately high contribu
tions made by and for participants entering at early ages. Even
so, the benefits to participants entering at advanced ages are
extremely small. It is expected that supplementary allowances
will be made to such persons under state legislation for assistance
to the needy aged and, as already indicated, provisions of that
sort were included in the actuaries’ estimates of ultimate annual
costs of the non-contributory old-age relief system.
The problem of “unearned annuities” confronts every pension
scheme at its inception. It has been pointed out by M. A.
Linton who served as consulting actuary to the president’s com
mittee, that the British plan, which was established in 1926 and
includes some 17,000,000 contributors, operates upon a different
theory from ours. It provided that maximum benefits should
be paid at the outset. The older workers in the insured occupa
tions “were not to be penalized because a system had not previ
ously existed to which they could have contributed.” Under
our plan the annuities relating to a given scale of earnings increase
over the period of time from 1937 to the date of reaching age 65,
and the full benefits will not be enjoyed for many years to come.
“To a much greater extent than in Great Britain,” says Mr.
Linton, “we have postponed the adequate treatment of the prob
lem presented by the accrued liabilities.” *
Under the British system the “unearned annuities” are met
by outright grants from the exchequer. The system is largely
on a current-cost basis. This is British realistic fiscal policy.
No attempt is made to build up reserves at the cost of denying
the present generation benefits which have been determined as
necessary and desirable and at the risk of dangling immense
sums of ready cash before the eyes of pressure groups and elec
tioneering politicians. The latter feature is the most disturbing
part of the American plan.
* M. A. Linton, op. cit.
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The contemplated creation of centralized reserves in liquid
form mounting to the stupendous figure of $47,000,000,000, fan
tastic and unreal though it may seem, has been written into the
law of the land. These funds will be under the control of Con
gress. In an effort to avoid constitutional difficulties, the act
was so drafted that no direct connection is to be traced between
the revenues to be raised under the taxation title and the creation
under another title of the reserve account from which the benefits
are to be paid. Under the act Congress is “authorized” to ap
propriate annually to the reserves amounts (nominally from gen
eral revenues) necessary to meet the requirements on an actuarial
basis. But Congress retains the power to modify the appropria
tion requirements and thus to use for other purposes the enormous
revenues which during the preliminary period will be rolling in
for the purpose of building up an interest-bearing fund—a pur
pose which to practical politicians will seem highly theoretical.
It is putting it mildly to say that the temptation for the diversion
of these funds or alternatively for liberalizing the annuity bene
fits will be strong.
Moreover, even under present provisions, the funds appro
priated to the reserves are required to be invested in government
or government-guaranteed obligations. The billions pouring in
in cash will thus be available not only for purchase of government
securities outstanding in the market—a contemplated procedure
which raises highly important but at present unanswerable
questions as to the effect on the investment and money markets—
but also for the purchase at par of newly created government
obligations. Thus there is provided a great pool of funds avail
able for extravagant government borrowing, which will lack any
of the credit controls ordinarily exercised by the investment
market.
Another curious and disquieting situation is created by the fact
that government or government-guaranteed securities to the
amount of $47,000,000,000 must theoretically be available for
investment of the reserves, whereas the amount of such debt
now is only approximately thirty-six billions, of which some
31½ billions are direct obligations of the government.
Various authorities * have pointed out the anomalies and dan
gers of this scheme from the standpoint of the integrity of the
plan itself and of the government finances. As was mentioned
* Notably M. A. Linton in Atlantic Monthly, April, 1936.
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at the outset, the provision for reserves of this magnitude was not
the result of recommendations of the president’s committee or of
its consulting actuaries and financial experts. The committee’s
plan called for tax rates commencing at 1% and rising after 20
years to 5% (2½% on employer and 2½% on employee) which
were estimated as sufficient to cover the disbursements for the
first thirty years and in addition to accumulate a reserve of about
$11,500,000,000, large enough to provide against current fluctua
tions in the revenues under the plan: after 1965, when disburse
ments would regularly exceed revenues, a federal subsidy from
general taxation, rising to a maximum of $1,100,000,000 a year,
would have been required.
*
The creation of such a reserve, it
may be noted, was slightly in excess of a figure of $10,000,000,000,
which in the opinion of advisors representing the treasury and
the federal reserve system was the maximum which might be
handled without too serious complications.
This scheme was abandoned by Congress on the plea of Secre
tary of the Treasury Morgenthau that the plan should be made
“self-sustaining.” It was desired to avoid the contemplated
annual subsidy of $1,100,000,000 from general revenues, none of
which as a matter of fact would have been required, under the esti
mates, before 1965. Under a non-reserve plan like the British
plan, such a subsidy would be required earlier, but under the
displaced plan of the president’s committee, with its moderate
tax and reserve provisions, income would still have exceeded
outgo for the next thirty years.
Even so, the claim that the new plan is self-sustaining does not
appear well-founded. Ignoring, for the present purpose, the
possible deficit of $1,160,000,000 a year due to estimating average
retirements at age 67½ instead of 65, it seems apparent that on
the basis of the present estimates themselves and fiscal conditions
as they are, a subsidy of $330,000,000 to $450,000,000 a year is
contemplated by the present plan, and that this subsidy will be in
effect increased by the amount of 3% a year on the face amount of
all government debt now existing which may be retired over the
next generation by a judicious policy of debt redemption suitable
for a period of prosperity.
The reasons underlying this statement go back to the fact that
* Richter and Williamson, op. cit., p. 314, et seq. These figures were increased to $15,000,000,000 and $1,500,000,000, respectively, to Include agricultural and domestic workers, who
were later excluded because of practical difficulties of administering a plan covering such
employments. (Casual labor was also omitted for the same reason.)
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the supposed actuarial balance of the fund is predicated on
annual interest earnings of $1,400,000,000 on a capital sum of
$47,000,000,000 invested in government obligations. If the fund,
however, were to absorb all of the $36,000,000,000 of such obliga
tions, including government-guaranteed debt, now outstanding,
an additional annual payment to it of $330,000,000 would be
required as “interest” on the remaining $11,000,000,000 in the
reserve. The information available for proper comprehension
of the intent and meaning of these features of the plan is defec
tive both as to clarity and completeness. It would seem absurd
to assume that unnecessary governmental expenditures outside
the scope of the plan would have to be incurred merely in order
to create an additional $11,000,000,000 of government obligations
for placement in the reserve fund on an interest-bearing basis.
Such an assumption, however, appears necessary to support
the claim that the plan is self-sustaining. Of course, if the gov
ernment should in fact increase its deficit another $11,000,000,000,
an annual payment to the fund of 3% on the new debt would
properly be chargeable in the national budget as interest expense
and not as a subsidy to the plan. But if, as everyone interested
in security should devoutly hope, governmental deficits are to
be brought under control, the creation of treasury obligations
for issuance to the fund in exchange for $11,000,000,000 cash
would amount to nothing more, from a fiscal point of view, than
the delivery of warehouse receipts for cash to be kept in trust
by the treasury and presumably immobilized in the federal re
serve system. The subsequent receipt by the fund, from the
treasury, of annual interest of $330,000,000 on the capital sum
would be nothing, from the viewpoint of the budget, but a sub
sidy to the plan from general revenues.
In addition, it is to be noted that the unemployment reserves
contemplated by the present act, which it has been estimated will
amount to $3,000,000,000 to $4,000,000,000 before being paid
out, have to be invested in government obligations. Either as
a subsidy to the old-age retirement plan or to the unemploy
ment-compensation plan, the provision of a return of 3% on these
sums (while unexpended) added to the $11,000,000,000 excess
investment funds already indicated, will be a charge on the
federal budget. This brings the total subsidy for the two plans
together to an amount ranging at times up to $450,000,000 a year,
of which it would appear that $330,000,000 is definitely chargeable
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to the retirement plan and the remainder is subject to allocation
on some basis to be determined. Without laboring the further
point as to the subsidy arising in an annual amount equivalent
to the interest on any government debt which may in the future
be retired, it seems clear that the fund is far from being self-sup
porting under the present set-up, and that the incalculable dan
gers of massed reserves are to be hazarded without obtaining any
compensating advantage even in theory.
From a practical standpoint, British experience and competent
expert advice pointed to the desirability that the fund be operated
partly on a current-cost basis. No fiscal advantage or actuarial
necessity was seen in attempting to make it self-sustaining. It
appeared wiser to have the benefits partly met out of current
revenues, where their costs would be apparent, than to create a
huge pool of funds, the existence of which would have unpredict
able though doubtless far-reaching monetary and general eco
nomic effects and would jeopardize the integrity of the fiscal
system during a period when with good management it might
otherwise be reconstituted on a sound basis.
The suggestion has been made by Mr. Linton * that the most
practicable way of avoiding the dangers of the reserve system of
operation would be to permit the 2% total annual tax applicable
to the years 1937 to 1939 to remain in effect indefinitely without
making the triennial increases up to the 6% maximum contem
plated by the act. He points out that on the basis of the esti
mates underlying the report of the Senate finance committee the
2% tax would annually produce more than enough to meet all
benefit payments and expenses until 1951, and that the invest
ment at 3% annually of the excess tax receipts prior to 1951 would
by that year create a reserve of $6,000,000,000. By then using
the principal of the reserve for payments the plan on the present
basis of benefits could be financed for a further twelve years
without raising revenue other than the 2% tax. A solution along
these lines, which should, however, presumably contemplate the
maintenance of a contingency reserve of moderate proportions,
would appear desirable.
IV. General Considerations

The four chief fields of insecurity suitable for coverage in a
broad program of social legislation have been classified by stu* Atlantic Monthly, April, 1936.
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dents as unemployment, loss of a bread-winner, old age and sick
ness. The present act deals with the first three and to a minor
extent with health services. It has been estimated that an ade
quate system of health insurance, such as was outlined by the
president’s committee, but not yet adopted, would require an
additional tax of 6% on wages.
The direct money costs of the law as it stands, on the basis of
estimates already discussed, may amount by 1980 to $4,500,000,000 a year, as indicated below:
Unemployment reserves—
Tax on employers, 3 % on pay-rolls re certain occupations.
Miscellaneous welfare grants (federal share—approximately
half).......................................................................................
Assistance to needy aged (federal half)..................................
Old-age retirement benefits—
Tax on employers, 3% on pay-rolls re certain occupations;
and tax on employees, 3% on income up to $3,000 a year
Deficit in interest on retirement-reserve account (see
page 448).........................................................................
Administration (see hereafter)................................................

Total (excluding state costs).............................................

$1,000,000,000
75,000,000
700,000,000

*2,180,000,000

330,000,000
225,000,000

$4,510,000,000

* Represents that portion (60%) of estimated annual benefits payable which
will be met by taxes (the remaining 40% being met by interest on the accumu
lated reserve). Estimate of benefits payable was based on assumption that
average contributor will retire at 67½. If in fact he retires at 65, additional
costs would have to be provided for (see page 443). Taxes cease when employee
attains age 65; benefits do not begin until he retires.

Certain students have emphasized that the cost of the social
security act, as the “first large-scale attempt to raise the funds for
providing economic security in a more orderly and controllable
manner,” represents to a very large extent the “redistribution of
an existing burden” and not new burdens on the productive
elements of the community.* Such a generalization is subject
to important qualifications. Certainly the burdens will not
exceed the burdens of the depression through which we have been
passing. But the costs of depression can hardly be taken as
normal. To the extent that unemployment reserves created in good
times will mitigate the burdens of the next depression, the costs
of the act will not be added costs. Beyond that, the assertion
that the costs represent largely a redistribution of existing burdens
begs the chief question raised, viz., whether the act will itself
*Eveline M. Burns, American Economic Review, March, 1936.
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encourage and create dependency. That question is unanswer
able on the basis of observed facts having important statistical
significance. It poses a riddle in social philosophy, to which the
possible answers, being no more than dialectic expositions of
individual theories of human behavior, are inconclusive. Only
an expert of some as yet undiscovered science of social accounting
could analyze the estimated costs of this legislation, as between
new and merely redistributed burdens, or allocate the new
burdens, such as they may be, between objects basically produc
tive to society and those to be accounted for as waste.
Where the burden of the taxes on the employer will in fact fall
is, of course, uncertain. In the opinion of Dr. Eveline M. Burns,
the greater part of it will be shifted forward to consumers or
backward to wage-earners. She further analyzes the question
as follows:
“The old-age annuities tax is perhaps more likely to fall on
consumers and the unemployment compensation tax to fall on
wage recipients. For the former makes no differentiation be
tween competing employers. All must pay a uniform tax.
But the unemployment compensation tax is less likely to be
shifted on to consumers because of the competition of employers
of less than eight workers (who are not covered by the tax), and
also because a number of states intend to adopt the merit-rating
system. Moreover, since workers know that employment in the
excluded trades or with employers of seven or less workers in
volves a loss of unemployment benefits in the future, they may
well be prepared to accept lower wages with larger employers.”*
On the other hand, some have assumed that the employers’
contributions will be in large part a charge against profits. If
such an assumption, as a generality, is tenable, it may be said
that the complete case for it has not yet been made, and the
weight of economic opinion appears to be against it. It has
also been urged, more convincingly, that industries whose prod
uct has a high labor content will be placed under a competitive
disadvantage by the social-security taxes and that the resulting
tendency in such industries will be toward increased mechaniza
tion and consequently increased technological unemployment.†
Such possible industry adjustments and the general question
of the final incidence of the costs and their effect on purchasing
* In her article last cited.
† For a discussion of this subject and exposition of the thesis that our export trade will be
placed under competitive disadvantages see Your Securities under Social Security, by Arundel
Cotter and Thomas W. Phelps—Dow, Jones & Co., Inc., N. Y. 1936.
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power are among the uncertainties of the program. Their po
tential importance would be substantially lessened by adoption
of the proposal to abandon the high reserve scheme of the retire
ment plan and keep the taxes for its support at the 2% level.
Such a policy, which, as has been noted, appears highly desirable
for other important reasons, would eventually throw current-cost
subsidies as a charge on the so-called “residual” system of old-age
assistance, supported in part by general federal revenues and in
part by state taxes. Whether this is a better solution from the
standpoint of incidence of taxes is a question to which a satis
factory answer might be found during the fifteen years or more
which would elapse before the problem would become a pressing
one.
It has been asserted that the social-security taxes will be pyra
mided in costs, like a sales tax. Eric A. Camman has conclusively
shown that this is not the case—that the tax on the labor content
of the product will go into costs but once, no matter how many
subsequent times the product may be processed. Mr. Camman
has also competently outlined the problem of administration, which
will present large but presumably not insuperable difficulties. In
dealing with the subject of administration costs, he uses an esti
mate of $225,000,000 annually.
*
The case for national action on the matters dealt with by the
act is summarized by the president’s committee on economic
security, in its report, in part as follows:
“From the best estimates which are obtainable, it appears that
in the years 1922 to 1929 there was an average unemployment of
8 per cent. among our industrial workers. In the best year of this
period, the number of the unemployed averaged somewhat less
than 1,500,000. ... At least one-third of all our people, upon
reaching old age, are dependent upon others for support. Less
than 10 per cent. leave an estate upon death of sufficient size to
be probated. There is insecurity in every stage of life. For the
largest group, the people in middle years, who carry the burden
of current production from which all must live, the hazards with
which they are confronted threaten not only their own economic
independence but the welfare of their dependents. . . . Many
people lived in straitened circumstances at the height of pros
perity ; a considerable number live in chronic want. Throughout
the twenties the number of people dependent upon private and
public charity steadily increased. With the depression, the
scant margin of safety of many others has disappeared.”
* Op. cit.
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Individual security is something hoped for but forever un
attainable. Social security in the broad sense, however—in the
sense of the continued stability of our institutions—may well be
served in important degree by this act, when it has been suitably
amended and after constitutional difficulties, if any, have been
surmounted. Its value in this respect should come from an ap
preciation by those caught in the wheels of the machine age that
a national responsibility toward them has been recognized.
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